"It's important not because of its technical quality but because of what it teaches us about our own customs, about past civilizations, and about virtuous behavior."

Though Socrates might agree with this on a certain point, i think that for the most part he would disagree. I think Socrates would define a good rhetor-lawyer to be one who has a set list of what is good and what is bad; there would not be a lesson on personal customs and past civilizations. Socrates disagrees with a lot of customs, and he is more interested in teaching how to advance and better the civilizations than looking back at them for answers.

I had the same thought regarding good lawyering (in the absence of the search for virtue) as being something resembling a "knack" such as cookery. One of the quotes, which I couldn't find the page for, talked about a good lawyer's ability to evoke responses in his jury appropriate to the truth of the matter; to put that more clearly, one could evoke anger when injustice has been done, vengeance toward someone deserving for his crime, and so on. Behind the passage seems to be an indication that a good lawyer/orator would not just evoke ANY emotion which could prove useful to his client's case, but rather to bring to the fore emotions which truly belong -- arising from the true nature of a case. This sort of moral discretion I think Socrates would approve of, because then he's not pandering but only persuasively arguing for what is true.

I definately think that socrates would call the second type of orator discussed, a panderer... He describes the art of oratory as more of skill with words and charisma of speaking while utilizing a general knowledge of the business of life... and while I personally would go more with this definition for a good orator, I don't think socrates would agree at all. I would agree with socrates however, in that you wouldn't call this person an expert by any means and in most instances he probably isnt seeking the truth... only the audience's persuasion.
amy_lee

I was thinking along the same lines as Kirby. A country's "spirit, customs, and discipline" aren't necessarily substantiated by the notion that "wisdom must...have been employed in framing such laws" (58). Socrates: two thumbs down. First of all, you can create customs for any reason, not just because you think it's the wisest thing. Second of all, even if you think it's the wisest thing, have you arrived at your conclusion through the best method? I don't think Socrates would buy an argument for, essentially, the will of the people as having anything to do with the Truth.

I guess that we are all in agreement that Socrates would not take kindly to the technical lawyer, I'm sure he would put him in the same category with the cook and maybe even spit on him (if, ofcourse, Socrates did such things). I would have to agree in part with jmaddox, I think that socrates would not find as much fault in Crassus' ideal lawyer as he would in the technical lawyer but he would also think of him as a panderer because Socrates would say that the ideal lawyer should seek the truth himself and not just follow the traditions of the past.

Guys, I'm so sorry I'm late. I'm an idiot and I thought I was the discussion leader for next time. AAAAAAAAGH I'VE GOT SO MUCH TO DO THIS WEEK!! But here goes nothing. I apologize if this makes no sense; I'm running on about an hour of sleep right now, and I've been going for awhile. I'll amass my scatterbrains by tomorrow, I promise.

Socrates would probably support the second type of lawyer-rhetor because he focuses not on the effectiveness of his oratory, but on the pursuit of virtue. He is not so much concerned with the technical, practical aspects of his speech; while he looks for past precedent, he does so for the sake of virtue. However, if he only focuses on what worked in the past instead of what was virtuous or good in the past, Socrates might find fault with his methods. Therefore, whether or not Socrates would find fault in the second lawyer-rhetor would depend entirely on the ends that he is pursuing, not necessarily the means. But Crassus describes the second lawyer-rhetor as someone who pursues the good: “From [civil laws] we perceive that virtue is above all things desirable, since honest, just, and conscientious industry is ennobled with honors, rewards, and distinctions” (57). It could be that I am misinterpreting Crassus’ argument, but it seems to me that he believes past precedent—the traditions and values embedded in civil laws—is a good place to start if you want to pursue virtue. Socrates would have a hard time arguing against any method if its objective is to pursue the truth.

Any of the “ambulance chasers” you see who advertise on public transportation or on the back of the phone book are probably not concerned with the virtue of the cases they try. Instead, they appeal only to technical aspects of the law. If they can win a case based on technicalities, they emerge victorious; they don’t necessarily need a moral victory. By being persuasive—what Antonious would describe as an effective orator—they win their case. They are not concerned with the broader issues behind each individual case. While they might not defend someone who is outright evil, they are more concerned about professional advancement than morals.

Someone who would fit Crassus’ definition of an ideal lawyer might be even be someone like George W. Bush; even if you disagree with his politics as vehemently as I do, he frequently appeals to traditions and the virtue associated with the past. I also noticed John Kerry doing that pretty frequently during the last election.

A bit more: Crassus says that “the end proposed in civil law” is the “preservation of legitimate and practical equity in the affairs and causes of the citizens,” emphasis mine (55). The lofty pursuit of the good that Socrates endorses is not present in what Crassus describes. Socrates would be adamantly opposed to Antonius’ definition of an orator. Antonius counters Crassus’ suggestion that an orator must have extensive knowledge of civil law and other arts and sciences, because an orator’s function is to be effective and persuasive. He argues that oratory and philosophy exist in two completely different spheres, and the orator should “effectively penetrate the minds of men” (67). He must be familiar enough with his audience to persuade them effectively, but nothing more. He “works upon their senses and feelings”—eloquence trumps knowledge (67). The pursuit of the good is not even an issue. Getting a reaction from an audience requires no knowledge of the good, nor does it require an attempt to reach the good. It relies solely on the orator’s skills.

I don't know if Socrates would necessarily find Crassus' ideal lawyer to be a forthright panderer, but I do believe he would eventually not find favor in him. I wonder because Socrates seems to think that knowledge makes a man good because he knows that "good" is how a man of virtue conducts himself. He deductively reasons that seeking truth leads to finding knowledge and knowledge leads to knowing how to conduct yourself, which leads to choosing virtue because you know it's what is best for you. Crassus thinks this desire for virtue is rooted in the civil laws and enactments. He says that "virtue is above all things desirable, since honest, just, and conscientious industry is ennobled with honours, rewards and distinctions..."(57, XLIII). Thus the conflict lies in that Socrates thinks that the individual path to truth leads to this desire, not civil laws. Although they have the same beliefs, the belief behind their beliefs is conflicted.

Just as the others said, I think a technical lawyer is any lawyer that represents a client who is blatantly guilty, has incriminating factual evidence on record, and etc. Despite that, they do their best to 'defend' the guilty party, I guess because they feel they can carry out the role of practising justice the way it was formulated. The second example...I'm not trying to sound like a prosecutor, but would not the current US government and figures in Washington be an example? The in-office politicians seem to think everything they decide, or do without our knowledge, is completely accurate because 'the constitution says so.' While this may sound loyal...previous tradition is not eternally correct. I know America is a tradition-based society, but when it comes to the well-being of this country, I am not so sure that full reliance on the founding fathers' ideologies is necessarily appropriate.

I meant this as a response to jmaddox, so I would appreciate it if you would just kind of tag it on there when you read it. Thanks! =)

I would argue that lawyers defend people they know are guilty not to just make money but because they believe in a system that allows representation and a trial by jury - which follows along with the whole tradition and liberty thing.

I wonder about Socrates opinion of the latter as well. Crassus has done the whole dialectic breakdown concerning what he meant by law. Turns out the specific area of law he thinks is so important is law that "perceive that virtue is above all things desirable" (57). Is this something Socrates would be so opposed to?

However I do agree with your assessments of the above politicians. I don't think any of them are motivated to do the wrong thing. They all think that according to their knowledge of customs and laws, that they are pursuing the best path. They believe different paths are the best; however, I believe proving that "right" doesn't have to be this unchanging thing that applies in all circumstances.

I could be wrong about this but I got the vibe that Socrates would not find fault in the second lawyer. Well part of me thinks that he would find the second lawyer to be pandering but then on page 60 when he says, " who, in the next place, can move with safety even amid the weapons of his adversaries.......who can rouse a spiritless and desponding people to glory, or reclaim from infatuation, or inflame their rage against the guilty...or calm it by his eloquence." I think here Socrates might say that the lawyer was pursuing the good. Although the more I think about it maybe it is just pandering? I'm not sure, maybe someone else can comment on that.
As for contemporary examples, I agree with the above post that any lawyer who would defend someone like Sadam Hussein would be a technical lawyer. I think the second lawyer would be someone's own opinion, however in my opinion I agree with people like Barack Obama and John McCain.

But I'm ready to post, dammit! =)
So here is my response:

Socrates would likely find fault in Crassus' ideal lawyer. He would call it a form of pandering. The study of the 12 tables gives lawyers an education of the customs and traditions of a country, which Crassus deems as necessary for a lawyer (or orator). Crassus argues that “as much wisdom must be thought to have been employed in framing such laws, as in establishing so vast and powerful an empire” (p. 58). He maintains that if this much thought went into the formation of these laws and customs, they must be of great use. Socrates would agree with this reasoning, but he would say that every custom and tradition and law must be closely analyzed and judged by its level of truth. If this does not happen, said lawyer is only a panderer that is reading the law the way he/she thinks people want it to be read instead of basing his/her decisions on justice and truth.

In regards to contemporary figures, examples of the technical lawyer would be the many lawyers (attempting) to defend Saddam Hussein during his trial. There is no doubt that what he did was wrong, yet lawyers are still willing to represent him. I would also use lawyers who defend clients that they know are guilty as an example. They defend these clients not because they truly believe they are innocent, but because they are working to obtain this client’s money.
Examples of Crassus’ ideal orator would be people like Barack Obama, John McCain, Colin Powell, and John Kerry. These politicians base their decisions on the traditions, customs, and laws of Americans. They use their combined knowledge of the law, of customs and traditions, and of their own life experiences to make sound decisions concerning American legislation.